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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 908 (1994)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In paragraph 3 of its resolution 908 (1994), the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for an additional period terminating on 30 September 1994. The present report is intended to assist the Council in its deliberations on the renewal of the mandate of UNPROFOR and is complementary to the comprehensive analysis of the mandate of UNPROFOR already submitted in my report of 16 March 1994 (S/1994/300). It provides an account of recent developments in the area that have affected the environment in which UNPROFOR has to operate.

II. STRUCTURE OF UNPROFOR

2. UNPROFOR is headed by my Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and includes military, civil affairs (including civilian police), public information and administrative components. Its headquarters is in Zagreb, Croatia. As of 15 September 1994, the strength of the military component, commanded by the Force Commander, Lieutenant General Bertrand de Lapresle of France, amounted to 38,582, including 624 United Nations military observers from 32 countries. There are 641 civilian police, 1,870 international civilian staff (including 1,353 contractual personnel who are not members of the international civil service) and 2,188 local staff. UNPROFOR is thus the largest peace-keeping operation in the history of the United Nations. It is divided into three operational commands: UNPROFOR (Croatia) led by Major General Ghazi Tayyeb of Jordan, UNPROFOR (Bosnia and Herzegovina) led by Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and UNPROFOR (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) led by Brigadier General Tryggve Tellefsen of Norway.

III. CROATIA

3. In the period under review, UNPROFOR's activities in Croatia have been focused on the monitoring of the general cease-fire agreement signed in Zagreb on 29 March 1994 by the Government of Croatia and the local Serb authorities in the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) (see S/1994/367, annex). The agreement constitutes a major achievement that has significantly reduced active

hostilities between the conflicting sides in Croatia. While the Croatians quickly implemented the agreement, the Serbs took a longer time to implement key provisions of it. By the end of May, however, UNPROFOR reported almost total compliance, characterized, inter alia, by a general cessation of hostilities, withdrawal of forces beyond fixed lines of separation and the placement of heavy weapons in agreed storage sites. UNPROFOR has assumed exclusive control over the zone of separation, which covers an area of over 1,300 square kilometres. Since 29 March, the United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) has conducted over 6,000 patrols in the zone of separation.

4. The implementation of the cease-fire agreement raised expectations that the parties would enter into comprehensive discussions on issues of mutual economic benefit, followed by talks on a final political settlement, under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. The opening of economic negotiations was scheduled to take place in mid-April. However, during the months of April and May, the local Serb authorities in Knin issued a number of statements that appeared to close the door on political reconciliation. They announced their intention to pursue full integration with other Serb areas, thus setting back hopes for an early settlement with Croatia, and stipulated unrealistic preconditions for talks. It proved impossible to open negotiations at that stage. Renewed efforts were made in June. However, disagreement over modalities for the negotiations led to the cancellation of talks scheduled for 16 and 17 June.

5. While the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia has continued to lead efforts to start the economic negotiations and define an acceptable agenda, UNPROFOR has focused primarily on strengthening compliance with the cease-fire agreement, in order to maintain a climate conducive to peace. These efforts have faced several setbacks involving a number of incidents in the UNPAs. In Sector West, despite assurances to the contrary, Croatia has, since mid-May, maintained between 300 to 500 "special police" in positions close to the former contact line. Incursions by local Serb forces across the contact line have also led to the death of two Croatian soldiers and one civilian. In Sector South, the Croatian side appeared to expect that water facilities on the Serb side would come under UNPROFOR control and management, without the need for Serb agreement; UNPROFOR, however, can function effectively only with the consent and cooperation of the parties. There has also been a series of violent incidents, including the destruction by explosives of an UNCIVPOL station and an incursion into the zone of separation by 100 Serb soldiers, of whom a small number remain.

6. In an already charged atmosphere, the Association of Displaced Persons of Croatia in early July imposed a blockade on all the crossing-points into or within the UNPAs, in order to draw attention to their plight and apply pressure on UNPROFOR to expedite their return to their homes in the Protected Areas. The Croatian Government maintained that it was not in a position to take decisive action to lift the blockades. As outlined in my letter to the President of the Council of 26 July 1994 (S/1994/888), the resultant restrictions on UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its mandate, particularly on the Croatian side of the zone of separation, were a serious violation of the terms of the cease-fire agreement and gravely disrupted UNPROFOR's ability to discharge its duties, in particular

its monitoring responsibilities. There were also major disruptions to UNPROFOR's logistics operations and scheduled troop rotations.

7. Senior military and civil affairs officials from UNPROFOR embarked on a series of high-level discussions with the Croatian authorities to secure the latter's full adherence to the cease-fire agreement. Following the Security Council's presidential statement (S/PRST/1994/44) of 11 August, the blockade was eventually lifted on 19 August. However, Croatian police moved the location of the Lipik crossing-point in Sector West closer towards Serb positions, in disregard of the cease-fire agreement, which freezes all tactical positions within 10 kilometres of the contact line. In these circumstances, UNPROFOR is not prepared to use the crossing-point and continues to insist on its return to its original position.

8. Although 17 of the 19 crossing-points are now in use, tensions persist on this issue. During the blockades, a number of public statements made by Croatian leaders referred to the possibility of having to resort to military action to reintegrate the UNPAs if progress could not be achieved peacefully. This fostered Serb fears of a Croatian attack, and resulted in a withdrawal of numerous Serb heavy weapons from storage sites.

9. Despite these setbacks and violations, both sides continue to express support for the cease-fire agreement, and UNPROFOR has intensified its efforts to restore full compliance with its provisions. Following mediation by the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, senior officials from the Croatian Government and local Serb authorities were brought together for discussions in Knin on 5 August. Committing themselves to continuing the negotiating process, they agreed to establish eight expert groups to prepare for future negotiation on specific economic areas. During subsequent contacts between the International Conference and officials from the Croatian Government and the local Serb authorities, as well as between my Special Representative and the latter, agreement was reached to begin negotiations on the opening of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway. A compromise proposal was presented by the International Conference, which has proved to be unacceptable to the Croatian Government. It has therefore not yet been possible to open direct negotiations on this issue.

10. The Prevlaka Peninsula, which was demilitarized under UNPROFOR supervision following the adoption of Security Council resolution 779 (1992) of 6 October 1992, with the creation of a "blue zone" that only UNPROFOR personnel may enter, is of considerable strategic importance to both the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Croatia. If UNPROFOR was to withdraw before a final political settlement is reached, there is a risk that hostilities would resume in the area. As UNPROFOR's presence continues to be required, I have requested my Special Representative, in co-operation with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference, to lend his good offices to resolve the remaining difficulties in coordination, as appropriate, with the local authorities.

11. By its resolution 908 (1994), the Council authorized the extension of close air support to the territory of Croatia. Discussions between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and UNPROFOR are continuing on technical aspects of

this issue. In the meantime, the North Atlantic Council has, in principle, authorized close air support in the event of attacks from Croatian territory against the "safe area" of Bihac.

IV. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

12. While significant progress has been made in stabilizing the military situation in many parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, events in recent months have demonstrated the fragility of the peace on the ground. Military restraint by the warring parties in some areas was undermined by aggressive acts in others, resulting in a marked variation in progress towards normalization of life in different parts of the country. The continuation of warfare in parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, should not be allowed to obscure the largely successful peace-keeping work carried out by the Force. UNPROFOR has been a significant factor in facilitating the improvement of the population's living conditions through, for example, its promotion of local cease-fires, its negotiation and implementation of agreements on a variety of issues ranging from the release of prisoners to the repair and improvement of public services and its assistance in the evacuation of the wounded and sick.

13. Following the signature on 23 February 1994 of a cease-fire agreement between the Bosnian government army and the Bosnian Croat forces (see S/1994/216), as well as the agreement subsequently reached in Washington on 10 May 1994 on the creation of the Bosniac-Croat Federation, UNPROFOR has been closely involved in the implementation of all its military aspects, bringing a large degree of stability and peace to central Bosnia and western Herzegovina. UNPROFOR was instrumental in achieving a breakthrough in an agreement on freedom of movement in the Mostar area, which was implemented on 23 May, and resulted in a rapid improvement in the quality of life for residents on the eastern bank of the Neretva River. UNPROFOR has also played a pivotal role in monitoring the demilitarization of Mostar, a precondition for the establishment of the European Union administration in that city on 23 July 1994. In central Bosnia, UNPROFOR has also been involved, from an early stage, in negotiations on freedom of movement both for the population and for commercial traffic. While freedom of movement is not complete, some commercial convoys, under the security provided by UNPROFOR's presence, have been able to move from the coast to southern, central and northern Bosnia. Some infrastructural problems have been overcome, although economic rehabilitation has barely begun.

14. Shortly after the last renewal of its mandate, UNPROFOR was confronted with a rapidly deteriorating situation in Gorazde (see S/1994/600), which resulted in the first use of close air support against Serb ground targets on 10 and 11 April 1994. The crisis in Gorazde led me to request additional support from NATO, which in turn declared an exclusion zone around Gorazde on 22 April 1994. On the same date, an agreement was reached in Belgrade between Bosnian-Serb leaders and my Special Representative, facilitated by President Milosevic of Serbia, that brought the Bosnian-Serb offensive to an end, provided for the immediate deployment of UNPROFOR military and civilian personnel, established a cease-fire, which has been largely respected, and required the Bosnian-Serb forces to withdraw from a 3-kilometre area from the centre of Gorazde town as

well as to redeploy all their heavy weapons outside a 20-kilometre circle from the same point.

15. In late April 1994 tensions mounted in and around the strategically important Posavina corridor, with frequent artillery, mortar and rocket exchanges affecting the Brcko, Tuzla and Orasje areas. In response, UNPROFOR mediated between the parties and eventually agreed with the Bosnian Serbs, on 5 May 1994, that a team of 16 United Nations military observers would be deployed in and around Brcko. That deployment was immediately carried out and UNPROFOR's presence in the area has significantly contributed to reducing tension and making an offensive by either side less likely.

16. After several weeks of intensive negotiations, UNPROFOR mediated the signing on 17 March 1994 of an agreement between the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian-Serb party on freedom of movement in the Sarajevo area. As a result, two routes across Sarajevo airport, one route from Sarajevo to Visoko and the bridge at Grbavica were reopened on 23 March 1994 for civilian traffic and humanitarian goods. From that date until 26 July 1994, when the Bosnian Serbs suspended the agreement on the airport routes, some 60,000 persons and over 12,000 vehicles used the Sarajevo-Butmir route, while nearly 100,000 civilians and 19,500 vehicles used the route linking two Serb suburbs. The other two routes remain open, with the Grbavica bridge used over the same period by over 6,500 persons and the Sarajevo-Visoko route by 11,500. UNPROFOR has been actively negotiating the reopening of the routes across the airport that had brought freedom of movement and a major improvement of living conditions, including the near-disappearance of black-marketeering, to all citizens of Sarajevo.

17. While UNPROFOR convoys into Sarajevo have not been seriously affected, UNPROFOR and humanitarian flights into the city have been targeted with increasing frequency, for the most part by the Bosnian-Serb side, resulting in one death and several severe injuries to UNPROFOR personnel. Despite some setbacks in recent weeks, UNPROFOR successfully negotiated an anti-sniping agreement in Sarajevo on 14 August 1994. The agreement by and large continues to hold and was instrumental in permitting a resumption of the city's tramway service, which had been suspended because of sniping. A similar anti-sniping agreement was concluded in Gorazde on 28 August 1994, which also appears to be holding well.

18. The Special Coordinator for Sarajevo, appointed pursuant to resolution 900 (1994) of 4 March 1994, began operations in Sarajevo on 16 April. He has established a coordination committee, which has become the focal point for restoration activities by donor Governments, as well as international and non-governmental organizations. Although the situation in Sarajevo has not allowed rapid implementation of the projects identified in the plan of action, cooperation with the local authorities has been proceeding well, including with the Serb side, which has shown a willingness to cooperate on technical matters. The first meeting of the Committee of Donors is scheduled to be held on 20 September in Vienna. It is hoped that the concerted efforts of the United Nations and the international community, coupled with the undertakings of the Bosnian Government and the cooperation of local authorities, will make it

possible for conditions of life in Sarajevo to be substantially improved before the coming winter.

19. Despite the progress made in many areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, hostilities erupted along many parts of the confrontation line between government and Serb forces after an initial period of calm following the Gorazde crisis. After the adoption of resolution 913 (1994) of 22 April 1994 and the Council's presidential statement of 1 June 1994, UNPROFOR actively pursued the conclusion of a comprehensive cessation of hostilities as the only viable and durable alternative to the partial and local military solutions described above. However, on 8 June 1994 it managed to obtain only the agreement of the government and Bosnian-Serb sides to a one-month cessation of offensive action and provocative activities, as well as to the immediate release, under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), of prisoners-of-war and detainees and the exchange of information on persons whose whereabouts are unknown. While this agreement was still in effect, government forces attempted to capture dominating terrain or to secure routes in the areas of Ozren and Travnik. At the same time, Bosnian-Serb elements continued to expel Muslim civilians from the Banja Luka and Bijeljina areas and imposed new restrictions on the movement of convoys of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The agreement, which was renewed for an additional month in July, lapsed on 8 August 1994.

20. In the last two months of the mandate period, government forces have defeated the forces of the self-declared "Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia" in the Bihac area, resulting in an exodus of an estimated 25,000 refugees to the United Nations Protected Area of Sector North in Croatia. UNPROFOR extended full logistical and medical support to UNHCR and has been actively involved in creating conditions that would make the repatriation of refugees to the Velika Kladusa area possible. Meanwhile, government forces have also resumed operations in the Ozren and Travnik areas and advanced south from the areas of Breza and Dastansko. All these activities have been met by heavy Bosnian-Serb shelling and local counter-attacks at many points along the confrontation line. Although there has been no significant change to the confrontation line throughout this period and no wide-ranging and sustained general offensive by either side, the shifting pattern of localized attacks and counter-attacks has resulted in restrictions by both sides on UNPROFOR's freedom of movement. UNPROFOR made several unavailing attempts to persuade both sides to seek a negotiated rather than a military solution. The continued military activity has also undermined UNPROFOR's efforts to achieve a general cessation of hostilities agreement, as called for in the Council's presidential statement of 30 June.

21. Serious violations of human rights have persisted and UNPROFOR has continued to highlight and condemn strongly the incidence of torture, killings and expulsions of minorities within the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Efforts continue to ensure that the treatment of minorities in Serb-held areas fully complies with international norms and standards. UNPROFOR persists in its attempts to visit and establish a presence in Serb-controlled areas, particularly in Banja Luka and Bijeljina, which are the scenes of continued "ethnic cleansing" by Bosnian-Serb forces. In this connection, I welcome the Council's presidential statement of 2 September condemning the practice of ethnic cleansing wherever it occurs and by whomsoever it is committed.

22. The cease-fire agreement between Bosnian Croats and Bosniacs has greatly improved conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance throughout Central Bosnia. However, since the main prewar road communications with Tuzla continue to be interrupted by the line of confrontation, that city can be reached only by secondary roads through mountainous territory. With winter approaching, these roads will again become a challenge to UNHCR's and UNPROFOR's logistical capabilities. UNPROFOR continues to negotiate for the opening of the Tuzla airport to humanitarian flights but, despite repeated attempts to reconcile the positions of the government and Bosnian-Serb sides, this has yet to be achieved.

V. THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

23. The military situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has remained relatively calm and stable. Few border violations by military or police patrols have been observed along the border with Albania. However, since April there has been a rise in the frequency of encounters between patrols from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia along their common border. The majority of these encounters have been non-confrontational, indicating that neither party seems to wish to provoke conflict. Because of the continued non-recognition of the border by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), however, these incidents may recur with increasing frequency. While both sides have nominated commissions to address the issue, no date has been set for the start of bilateral discussions. Because of the threat to stability arising from unresolved border issues, the establishment of an international border commission is clearly needed.

24. The most serious difficulties experienced by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the past six months have been economic. Social stability has been endangered by rising unemployment and a declining economy resulting, inter alia, from the effects of the economic blockade imposed by Greece on 17 February 1994 and of the United Nations sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), formerly the country's primary trading partners. Internal political tensions between Macedonians and ethnic Albanians have also increased. In order to establish accurate estimates of the ethnic composition of the population, the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia conducted a nationwide population census from 25 June to 11 July 1994. The census was financed, partly organized and monitored by the Council of Europe and the European Union, with assistance from other bodies including the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and civilian components of UNPROFOR. Official results, as well as an expert assessment of the accuracy of the census, are expected in mid-October 1994, shortly before the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections.

25. Given the complex interrelation of external and internal factors contributing to economic and political uncertainty, and rising social tensions, the Security Council, in resolution 908 (1994) of 31 March 1994, encouraged my Special Representative, in cooperation with the authorities of the former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia, to use his good offices as appropriate to

contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in that Republic. In line with this broadened political mandate, my Special Representative has focused on practical ways of assisting the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia under these difficult conditions. The focus of UNPROFOR's political work, in line with the efforts of the Working Group on Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities of the International Conference of the Former Yugoslavia, has been on strengthening mutual understanding and dialogue among political parties and on monitoring human rights. UNPROFOR's military component has successfully mediated several tense border encounters, achieving the withdrawal of soldiers on both sides, and in early July succeeded in establishing an UNPROFOR observation post at Chupino Brdo on the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). In all these activities, UNPROFOR has maintained close coordination with other international bodies, including the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and CSCE.

VI. MINE-CLEARING ACTIVITIES BY UNPROFOR

26. The Washington Agreement on the Federation in Bosnia and Herzegovina of 1 March 1994 (S/1994/255, annex), and the cease-fire agreement in Croatia of 29 March 1994 (S/1994/367, annex 1), have opened the way for UNPROFOR to become more active in other humanitarian and confidence-building measures in its area of operation. An important obstacle to its work, and to progress towards normalcy in these areas, has been the presence of mines.

27. Under its present mandate, UNPROFOR has no specific role to play in mine clearance for humanitarian purposes. Nor would it be appropriate for UNPROFOR to take upon itself this dangerous task, which should be the responsibility of the parties themselves. However, by its presence on the ground, particularly within the zone of separation in Croatia, which is under its exclusive control, UNPROFOR has been best placed to assist in monitoring the efforts of the parties in mine-clearance activities. This role has helped to develop confidence-building measures between the parties.

28. UNPROFOR's activities in this area cover mine-awareness programmes to assist humanitarian agencies in preparing their programmes with local authorities; gathering of mine information and records from the parties for dissemination to humanitarian agencies and local authorities as appropriate; and coordination and monitoring of mine clearance by the parties and related activities by other international and non-governmental organizations. In carrying out these activities, together with their normal operational duties, UNPROFOR units have sustained mine casualties, many of which could have been avoided had mine-protected vehicles been available.

29. The Security Council may wish to endorse the activities undertaken by UNPROFOR in relation to mine-clearance in both Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and support the acquisition of a small number of protected vehicles for use in areas of mine hazard.

VII. PUBLIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

30. In its first two years of operation UNPROFOR, like other United Nations peace-keeping operations, has become conscious of the lack of objective and accurate information in the mission area as well as of the harmful consequences of propaganda and disinformation about its role. With the establishment of a separate Division of Information in February 1994, UNPROFOR has attempted to overcome this deficiency. Public information activities have been focused on informing the population in the mission area about UNPROFOR's mission, mandate and activities, with a view to increasing public understanding and support of its efforts. The Division now consists of four production units - television, radio, publications and print production and promotion - and includes offices in Zagreb, Sarajevo, Skopje, Belgrade and each of the four United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia.

31. In recent months, in accordance with paragraph 55 of General Assembly resolution 48/42, there has been a considerable expansion of the Division's public information programmes in local languages and a number of new initiatives have been launched. Currently, UNPROFOR television programmes in local languages are broadcast on national television stations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It is hoped that these programmes will also be broadcast on Croatian national television in the near future. Publications, posters, pamphlets and booklets about UNPROFOR and its mission are produced in the local languages and distributed throughout the mission area. In addition, production of taped radio programmes has begun, and UNPROFOR has a daily 20-minute radio programme on a local station in Sarajevo.

32. While these activities are effective in reaching some audiences in the mission area, UNPROFOR currently lacks an independent means of reaching mass audiences on a daily basis without restriction, in order to provide accurate and impartial information and to promote public understanding of the mission, as well as to address issues of current interest. In a peace-keeping operation of the size and complexity of UNPROFOR, radio is clearly the most practical, efficient and cost-effective method of realizing this important objective. Accordingly, UNPROFOR plans to establish an independent UNPROFOR radio station that would give three quarters of the population of the mission area unhindered access to impartial, factual and timely information, thereby increasing public understanding and support for UNPROFOR's peace-making efforts in the former Yugoslavia. Provisions have already been made in the recent UNPROFOR budget proposal and have been approved by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, subject to a specific authorization by the Council. The Security Council is accordingly invited to endorse UNPROFOR's public information policy and programmes, including the establishment of the UNPROFOR radio station.

VIII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

33. This section will be issued as an addendum to the present report.

IX. OBSERVATIONS

34. The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia are closely interrelated and have a direct impact on UNPROFOR's operations in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In this context, the work of the Contact Group, which emerged in April of this year and involves five major Powers working with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, could be of great significance for UNPROFOR's future. The Contact Group's proposals for Bosnia and Herzegovina, as is well known, have been accepted by all the parties with the exception of the Bosnian Serbs, who remain adamantly opposed to them. As members of the Security Council are aware, I addressed a letter on 24 July 1994 to the President of the Council, which expressed my views on the possible consequences for UNPROFOR of acceptance by all the parties, or the continued non-acceptance by the Bosnian Serbs, of the Contact Group's peace proposals for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

35. With regard to Croatia, and as outlined in my report to the Security Council on 16 March 1994 (S/1994/300), there are four problem areas in UNPROFOR's mandate which require reassessment: the demilitarization of the UNPAs; the restoration of Croatian authority in the "pink zones"; the establishment of border controls; and assistance for the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes. All four require either enforcement or the consent of both parties for their implementation. UNPROFOR has neither the means nor the mandate for enforcement action of this nature, and the cooperation of the parties has been elusive.

36. While both sides expressed a willingness in May 1994 to enter into negotiations on the further demilitarization of the areas around the zone of separation, discussions have not yet begun. The deep sense of mistrust that still prevails among the Serbs precludes the possibility of the UNPAs being demilitarized in the near future. Similarly, the return to Croatian authority of the "pink zones", as required by Security Council resolution 762 (1992) of 30 June 1992, has been consistently rejected by the Serbs. It should be noted that, in establishing a zone of separation, the current cease-fire agreement has the de facto effect of suspending action on the status of the "pink zones" until further progress is achieved within the framework of that agreement. My report to the Council of 16 March 1994 (S/1994/300) makes clear in paragraphs 13 and 14 that the Serbs' continuing rejection of Security Council resolution 769 (1992) is very much linked to their disagreement with the provisions entailed in paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 820 (1993), under which de facto sanctions have been imposed on the UNPAs by subjecting the import, export and transshipment of goods to, from or through the UNPAs to explicit Croatian government approval. With no indication that the Serbs are reconsidering their opposition to this trade and border control, UNPROFOR remains unable to implement Security Council resolution 769 (1992). I should like to make clear to the Council that UNPROFOR will be in no position to implement resolutions 762 (1992) and 769 (1992) until there is a significant change in the attitude of the local Serbs and that it cannot, therefore, accede to the demands of the Government of Croatia that it take on responsibilities which it is clearly unable to fulfil.

37. Despite the inability of UNPROFOR to achieve important parts of its mandate in Croatia, the successful implementation of the cease-fire agreement has opened the possibility for some progress. It has dramatically reduced the number of war casualties and has allowed for increasing normalization of life, including improved economic prospects, particularly for tourism. However, despite this success, UNPROFOR continues to be severely criticized by the Croatian Government and media for its inability to fulfil its entire mandate, and to be threatened with unrealistic deadlines to fulfil tasks which, without the political will of both sides, cannot contribute to long-term stability. While the recriminations directed against UNPROFOR may be partly related to the Croatian political process, they also reflect certain incompatibilities in the Force's mandate, which have made it impossible to achieve the implementation of various tasks within a limited time-frame. The resultant gap between Croatian expectations of what the United Nations presence can deliver, and what UNPROFOR is actually capable of achieving in present circumstances, has become increasingly difficult to bridge.

38. Progress in Croatia has been slow and has proved insufficient to moderate understandable Croatian impatience for a quick solution to the problem of reintegration of the UNPAs into Croatia. Resort to a military option would have incalculable consequences, and would be unlikely to lead to a durable peace. Moreover, all efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict have not yet been exhausted. At this stage, however, the Croatian Government is not willing to negotiate on economic issues without simultaneously negotiating the political settlement. The local Serbs, on the other hand, are not ready to negotiate a political settlement without first having negotiated a number of economic confidence-building measures.

39. Assistance in the creation of conditions that would permit the voluntary return of displaced persons to their homes in or near the UNPAs continues to be of the highest priority for UNPROFOR. In my report of 15 February 1992 (S/23592), I informed the Council that I had asked that UNHCR assume responsibility for designing and implementing a scheme for the return of refugees and displaced persons. This was clearly predicated on a peaceful resolution of the underlying causes of displacement. With UNHCR assistance, several thousands of displaced persons have been able to return to their homes in the Dubrovnik, Sibenik and Zadar hinterlands. Return to more sensitive areas depends not only on the cease-fire but also on a political settlement, which alone would provide the conditions for a large-scale return in safety and dignity. Nevertheless, discussions are taking place among UNHCR, UNPROFOR and both parties on the implementation of a pilot project for voluntary return to a few selected villages in or near the zone of separation.

40. In considering the various options for UNPROFOR's presence in Croatia, I remain alert to the possibility that the situation on the ground could be frozen in a stalemate in which UNPROFOR's continued presence contributed only to the maintenance of an unsatisfactory status quo. I have no wish to recommend the indefinite prolongation of a peace-keeping presence if it is widely judged to be unable to carry out its mandate. I am also conscious that UNPROFOR's presence, and its ability to carry out its mandate, will depend on the will of the Croatian Government to continue to facilitate its work. (In this connection, I must stress once again the importance of the Government finalizing a status-of-

forces agreement with UNPROFOR without further delay.) However, in the present circumstances it is of the greatest importance to secure continued respect for the cease-fire agreement, which has now held for nearly six months. At the same time, further efforts will have to be made in order to create a basis for the reopening of negotiations. These are tasks which require the continued presence of UNPROFOR in Croatia. In any case, in the present fluid and uncertain situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I am concerned that a recommendation for a precipitate withdrawal from Croatia could jeopardize hopes for progress both there and in the former Yugoslavia as a whole.

41. With regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina, experience gained over the last six months has enhanced mutual understanding, joint planning and cooperation between UNPROFOR and NATO, and the successful deployment of long-awaited additional forces has enabled UNPROFOR to improve its ability to seize opportunities for progress. Nevertheless, the possibility of a further exacerbation and intensification of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina has highlighted UNPROFOR's limitations, and underlined a number of areas of concern. First, the constraints on UNPROFOR's ability to perform its responsibilities in the safe areas, outlined in my report of 8 May 1994 pursuant to resolution 844 (S/1994/555), remain largely unchanged. Secondly, the exclusion zones around Sarajevo and Gorazde, although highly successful in protecting the civilian population from mortar, artillery and tank fire, are expensive in manpower and difficult to enforce and cannot be maintained indefinitely in the absence of a comprehensive cessation of hostilities or, as a minimum, the demilitarization of those areas. This latter solution is now being pursued by UNPROFOR for Sarajevo. It is possible for any side to hide weapons, and UNPROFOR personnel, who are widely dispersed at weapons collection points, are vulnerable to any determined effort to remove weapons or take hostages. Thirdly, the supervision and enforcement of weapons exclusion zones places additional strains on UNPROFOR as an impartial force. All these difficulties are inherent in UNPROFOR's nature as a highly dispersed and lightly armed peace-keeping force that is not mandated, equipped, trained or deployed to be a combatant.

42. In addition to these limitations on its capabilities, UNPROFOR has continued to experience serious restrictions on its freedom of movement imposed by all sides, and especially by the Bosnian Serbs. While conducting operations in the Ozren area, and around Breza and Dastansko, Government forces have denied access to UNPROFOR patrols and, during the same period, the Serbs have significantly and frequently restricted convoy movements and patrolling throughout areas under their control, especially within the exclusion zones. Particularly serious have been actions by both sides that have led to the repeated closure of the Sarajevo airport. In the absence of improved relations between the Government and the Serb party, these difficulties will continue and may intensify. In particular, the pursuit by either side of military objectives, however limited or localized, is incompatible with the nature and purposes of UNPROFOR's deployment.

43. In the circumstances, I am conscious that some Member States may have come to believe that the strategy so far pursued by the international community, involving the deployment of a peace-keeping force dependent upon the active cooperation of the parties, is no longer adequate to serve the objectives proclaimed in the resolutions of the Security Council. However, the use of

"disincentives" such as the general imposition and stricter enforcement of exclusion zones around the safe areas in order to influence the outcome of the conflict, or the lifting of the arms embargo in favour of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, would change the nature of the United Nations presence in the area and imply unacceptable risks to UNPROFOR. The former action would place UNPROFOR unambiguously on one side of an ongoing conflict. The latter step would be tantamount to fanning the flames that the United Nations is deployed to extinguish. In both cases the result would be a fundamental shift from the logic of peace-keeping to the logic of war and would require the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

44. My position is not only one of peace-keeping principle. The Council is aware that the decisions of Member States to provide troops to UNPROFOR were based on the existing Security Council resolutions and on the assumption that the mandate of the Force would be implemented as a peace-keeping operation. Any attempt to redefine radically the conditions in which UNPROFOR's mandate is implemented and which could have implications for the security of its personnel may, therefore, lead the contributing States to exercise their sovereign right to terminate their contribution to the Force. Although some troop-contributing nations have expressed their willingness to continue their participation even in changed circumstances, I do not believe it to be in the interests of the United Nations for a peace-keeping force to be converted into one which, by mandate and composition, becomes a party to the conflict it was originally deployed to help the parties to bring to an end.

45. I have therefore directed that plans be finalized for a withdrawal at short notice. It is my judgement that, should this withdrawal become necessary, it would take place under extremely difficult conditions and might therefore require an early decision by the Security Council. A 60-day period of preparation would be the minimum necessary in order to arrange for the withdrawing troops to be adequately protected. In a number of foreseeable circumstances, this could be achieved only by the temporary introduction of a significant number of highly combat-capable ground forces provided by Member States outside the United Nations framework.

46. The Council should also be aware that any decision that would necessitate the withdrawal of UNPROFOR will have immediate implications for the Force's ability to implement its existing mandates. In particular, during its preparations for withdrawal, UNPROFOR would no longer be able to protect and support the civilian populations of the three outlying "safe areas", Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde. Nor would UNPROFOR any longer be in a position to execute the ground-monitoring functions that are an integral part of the arrangements for the weapons exclusion zones around Sarajevo and Gorazde.

47. Any consideration of decisions leading to the withdrawal of UNPROFOR has, however, to be weighed against the tasks that are currently being implemented successfully by UNPROFOR. In measuring the value of its continuing presence, it is necessary to consider what the costs would be if these tasks were to be abandoned. In the absence of an overall political settlement acceptable to all of the parties, UNPROFOR's current presence and activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina remain invaluable. UNPROFOR continues to play an essential and effective role as an impartial force, and represents, in a society faced with

the challenges of reconciliation and restoration, the principles and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations. Its usefulness in supporting humanitarian activities, facilitating local cease-fires and disengagements and fostering reconciliation and cooperation between communities argues in favour of a further renewal of its mandate.

48. At this stage, therefore, and barring any other developments in the situation on the ground, I do not recommend the withdrawal of the Force. Its current tasks are being effectively pursued. Its role in escorting humanitarian relief convoys has been greatly reduced in the reporting period. Increasingly secure movement has been possible throughout the contiguous territory controlled by the Federation. UNPROFOR will continue to have a vital role in support of UNHCR in the delivery of humanitarian assistance in this territory, including reconnaissance, road repair and maintenance and direct transport. I should like to stress, however, that security problems remain in relation to land access to Sarajevo and the safe areas, and UNPROFOR's assistance is essential for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to these enclaves, although the Force alone cannot ensure access. Even with UNPROFOR support, grave difficulties are foreseen for the humanitarian assistance programme unless progress is made towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict. If land access to the safe areas is denied by the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs, some assistance could continue to be delivered by air drops. However, this will not be adequate for Sarajevo, where the airlift can effectively be halted by a single shell or even a single armed individual.

49. The continued harassment of minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly by the Bosnian Serbs, has underlined the need for a more comprehensive mandate for UNCIVPOL. Currently, civilian police have a limited mandate to operate in Srebrenica, Tuzla and Mostar, an unofficial agreement to operate in Sarajevo and Gorazde, and no formal mandate to operate in other areas, including Velika Kladusa. It is my view that UNCIVPOL, under the supervision of the Head of Civil Affairs, should be given a mandate to operate throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Security Council may, therefore, wish to consider providing UNPROFOR with a uniform UNCIVPOL mandate for the whole mission area, similar to that already mandated for Croatia in resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992. It is my hope that UNPROFOR could promote, as is already the case in some areas, the protection of human rights in the difficult period ahead, not least in the transitional phase leading to the consolidation of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This would be a crucial role in the context of the return of refugees and displaced persons in safety and dignity.

50. In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, UNPROFOR's presence has demonstrated the value of preventive deployment. But its mission can be judged effective only if it ends successfully. That success will depend on external developments which UNPROFOR does not control. Unresolved disputes between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia over its name, state symbols, and constitution have blocked the latter's full membership in international organizations, while external threats to its economic stability and border security persist, including through the continuing economic blockade by Greece and the non-recognition by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's international

borders. In this context, I appeal to the Governments of Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to resume urgently their negotiations under the auspices of my Special Representative, Mr. Cyrus Vance, in order to reach agreement on issues of dispute. I would also take this opportunity to remind the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia of the necessity to conclude without further delay a status-of-forces agreement with UNPROFOR.

51. At this time of severe financial constraints for the United Nations, I am fully conscious of the high costs of UNPROFOR, which accounts for a substantial portion of the Organization's peace-keeping expenditures. I continue to examine ways in which to reduce costs, which in turn will require a firm expectation by the international community that the parties to the conflict cooperate with the United Nations, negotiate with each other in good faith, honour and sustain mutual agreements and agree to take up as soon as possible their full responsibilities for fostering mutual recognition and normalization, including preserving the rights and welfare of all citizens.

52. I therefore recommend to the Security Council the renewal of UNPROFOR's mandate for a period of six months, and propose to report further to the Council as necessary on progress towards implementation of the mandate, in the light of developments on the ground and other circumstances affecting the mandate of UNPROFOR.

53. I should like to pay tribute to my Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, to the Force Commander, Lieutenant General Bertrand de Lapresle, and to the brave men and women of UNPROFOR for their remarkable courage and dedication in the performance of their duties. I should also like to express my gratitude to the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg and Lord Owen, for their unremitting efforts for peace, and to NATO for its close collaboration with, and support of, UNPROFOR.

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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In its presidential statement of 25 August 1994 (S/PRST/1994/46), the Security Council took note of my report of 17 August 1994 (S/1994/977) and requested me to submit to it, well before 30 September 1994, a substantive report on prospects for national reconciliation in Somalia and on possible options for the future of the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II).

2. However, in the light of current developments in Somalia, the report called for by the Security Council will be submitted in two parts. The present part gives a factual account of recent developments in Somalia in the political, security and humanitarian fields. My assessment of progress concerning national reconciliation and my recommendations will be contained in the second part of the report, which I plan to submit by mid-October. The second part will draw upon the results of the visit to Somalia being currently undertaken by Mr. Kofi A. Annan, Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

3. In its presidential statement of 25 August, the Security Council expressed concern that the national reconciliation conference, which the 15 signatories to the Addis Ababa agreement (see S/26317) had agreed to convene on 15 May 1994 in their Nairobi Declaration of 24 March 1994 (see S/1994/614, annex I) had not taken place. The Council commended the efforts of my Special Representative to reinvigorate the process of national reconciliation, including through the encouragement of local and regional initiatives and conferences. It also stated that it attached great importance to accelerated inter-clan reconciliation, in particular among the Hawiye subclans, with the involvement of all concerned. In this connection, the Council will recall that, in my previous report (S/1994/977), I expressed agreement with the assessment of my Special Representative that conflicts within the Hawiye clan constituted the major obstacle to national reconciliation and that the successful conclusion of a Hawiye peace conference would greatly facilitate the national reconciliation process.

4. Since my last report, my Special Representative has been engaged in intensive consultations with Mr. Ali Mahdi, General Aidid and the Imam of Hirab, Imam Mahamoud Imam Omar, concerning arrangements for convening the Hawiye peace conference and the national reconciliation conference. During their discussions, the Imam of Hirab confirmed to my Special Representative the willingness of both Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid to participate in the conferences. In separate discussions with my Special Representative, both General Aidid and Mr. Ali Mahdi assured him of their support for the initiative of the Imam to resolve differences among the Hawiye subclans (Abgal, Habr Gedir, Hawadle and Murusade) as a prelude to the national reconciliation conference.

5. The Imam of Hirab advised my Special Representative that it would be necessary to arrange separate meetings between the Habr Gedir and the other subclans before proceeding to a plenary session of the Hawiye peace conference. He was confident that this process would succeed and result in the establishment of district and regional councils in Benadir (Mogadishu) as well as the appointment of a governor for Benadir.

6. Over the past few weeks, the Imam has held meetings with various subclan leaders. His efforts culminated in the convening on 20 August 1994 of a meeting attended by 36 representatives from the Mudulood clan family (including Abgals) and the Habr Gedir. The participants unanimously agreed that, in order to facilitate the restoration of peace in Mogadishu, their respective "technicals" must withdraw to their original areas of control. A committee was accordingly established to monitor and oversee the removal of the "technicals".

7. Subsequently, a political subcommittee of the Hirab Reconciliation Committee, set up by the Imam in January 1994, was reconvened from 28 to 30 August 1994 at a hotel in north Mogadishu. During the meeting, the Hirab subclans (Abgal and Habr Gedir) agreed that all militia men should be withdrawn from contested areas with immediate effect. Agreement was also reached that all checkpoints and roadblocks set up by the various clan militias in the city should be removed by 3 September 1994. Furthermore, a joint committee was established to resolve the issue of the roadblocks and the positioning of militia at the entrance to Mogadishu seaport and airport.

8. On 3 September 1994, the Imam of Hirab also led a 13-man peace mission of the Mudulood clan family to Medina district, where he secured the agreement of feuding clans in the district to disarm their militias and to appoint a committee of elders to settle their disputes in accordance with Somali tradition.

9. Similar agreements have been reached by the Habr Gedir and Murusade in Mogadishu with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace agreement between the two subclans. A follow-up mechanism for the implementation of agreements reached, including a cease-fire monitoring committee and a committee of elders, has been established.

10. On the whole, the initiatives of the Imam and other concerned Hawiye clan leaders appear to have had a salutary effect on the security situation in Mogadishu, although continued sightings of "technicals" remain a cause for concern.

11. Members of the Council will recall that the Somali factions had indefinitely postponed the preparatory meeting for the national reconciliation conference, called for under the Nairobi Declaration. The postponement was intended to allow sufficient time for consultations on the participation of the Somali National Movement (SNM) in the national reconciliation process; for the convening of the Congress of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), which was to elect a new leadership of the faction; and for the conclusion of the Lower Juba Reconciliation Conference.

12. The Lower Juba Reconciliation Conference was successfully concluded on 18 June 1994. There have been no major violations of the Lower Juba peace agreement and the cease-fire is holding. The implementation committee has been meeting in Kismayo with a view to formulating a plan of action for the implementation of the agreement. The leaders of the Lower Juba Reconciliation Conference and the Absame Reconciliation Conference have continued to meet in an effort to merge the two peace processes in order to consolidate peace in both the Lower and the Middle Juba regions. The Chairman of the Lower Juba Reconciliation Conference, General Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmed "Liqliqato", held successful meetings from 7 to 9 September 1994 with Imam Sayed Hussein, Chairman of the Absame Reconciliation Conference, and General Mohamed Said Hersi "Morgan". Agreement was reached at these meetings to set priorities for the Juba regions and to expedite the implementation of the Lower Juba and Absame peace agreements.

13. The Fifth Congress of SSDF, following two months of intensive consultations, elected Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf as its new Chairman on 22 August 1994. The election of Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf has been accepted and Mr. Abdirazak Haji Hussein, the nominee of the supreme committee of the Sultans of the north-east to the chairmanship of SSDF, has recognized the election of Abdullahi Yusuf. The Congress was concluded on 26 August 1994 and consultations are continuing to consolidate its outcome. Following his election as SSDF Chairman, Colonel Yusuf has affirmed his commitment to assist in bringing together the southern factions in Mogadishu in order to facilitate national reconciliation, on the basis of the Addis Ababa agreement and the Nairobi Declaration.

14. With respect to developments concerning the participation of SNM in the national reconciliation process as called for under the Nairobi Declaration, the SNM Chairman, Mr. Abdirahman Ahmed Ali, met with the chairmen of the other three north-west-based political factions (Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA), United Somali Party (USP) and United Somali Front (USF)) in Djibouti, from 13 to 17 August 1994, to consider the situation in the north-west. At the end of their meeting, they issued a joint statement declaring, inter alia, that secession of the north was neither feasible nor desirable and that the national reconciliation conference envisaged under the Nairobi Declaration was long overdue and should be convened not later than September 1994. The statement also proposed the adoption of a federal system of government for Somalia and conveyed an offer by the four factions to use their good offices to mediate between the factions in the south.

15. A joint delegation of three of the north-west-based factions (SNM, USF and SDA) arrived in Mogadishu on 30 August 1994 to mediate between the factions of

the south. The joint delegation informed my Special Representative that the purpose of their mission was to promote and facilitate national reconciliation. The north-west-based factions believed that they had a responsibility at that stage to play a special role in breaking the impasse among the factions of the south in order to advance national reconciliation. They outlined their plan, which included, first, securing the broad agreement of the southern factions to the concept of a federal system of government for the whole of Somalia. That would be followed by further efforts to find a basis for reconciling SNA and the Group of 12 in order to expedite the national reconciliation process and the formation of an interim Government. The joint delegation was confident that, through its mediation, the preparatory meeting for the national reconciliation conference would be convened by the end of September 1994, and that all signatories to the Addis Ababa agreement would participate in the meeting.

16. Since its arrival, the joint delegation of SNM, USF and SDA has also held consultations with General Aidid, and the Somali National Alliance (SNA), Mr. Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, Chairman of the United Somali Congress (USC), and Mr. Ali Mahdi. The north-west-based factions also intend to meet with the Imam of Hirab to discuss national reconciliation after their consultations with Mr. Ali Mahdi and General Aidid.

III. MILITARY AND SECURITY ASPECTS

17. In its presidential statement of 25 August 1994, the Council expressed its belief that the Secretary-General's recommendations for a reduction of the UNOSOM II Force contained in his report of 17 August 1994 (S/1994/977) were appropriate in the circumstances prevailing in Somalia. The Council stressed that priority should be given to ensuring the safety and security of UNOSOM II and other international personnel, including that of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and underlined the responsibility of the Somali parties in that connection.

18. Accordingly, the Force Commander took immediate steps to reduce the Force level by 1,500 by the end of September 1994 and thereafter to bring it down to 15,000 all ranks by the end of October. These reductions will bring the Force to a level 31 per cent below the strength of 22,000 authorized by Security Council resolution 897 (1994).

19. It is planned to carry out the reduction process in two phases. Phase I is being achieved by repatriating four units: one Pakistani infantry battalion of 879 all ranks and the Romanian field hospital of 234 all ranks, both located in Mogadishu; the Botswanan contingent of 423 all ranks, located in Bardera; and the Irish transport unit of 90 all ranks, located in Baidoa.

20. Phase II of the reduction, in October 1994, will be achieved by repatriating two additional infantry units from Nepal located in Mogadishu and one Nigerian infantry unit in Merka and reducing by 4.5 per cent all other national contingents and the Force headquarters.

21. The reduction plan has been adopted to make maximum use of forthcoming scheduled rotations and to repatriate soldiers who have completed their tour of

duty. Furthermore, the plan retains the multinational structure of UNOSOM II and allows contingent commanders the flexibility of deciding which personnel will be repatriated from their contingents in order to maintain the operational capabilities of the Force. The plan involves withdrawing forces from those areas where the situation is relatively stable at present. The maximum possible time is thereby provided for humanitarian activities to continue under the protection of UNOSOM forces where protection is most needed.

22. Although the Force would continue to perform the main tasks assigned to it under its current mandate, security considerations have already begun to affect the performance of UNOSOM. The Force Commander has therefore decided to concentrate the troops. The purpose of the concentration, by deploying contingents strong enough to react successfully to an attack, is to avoid the repetition of the kind of incident that occurred in Belet Weyne on 29 July when a small UNOSOM contingent was overrun by a strong militia force. As a result of the concentration of forces and the reduction process, troops have already been withdrawn from several locations: Bardera, Hoddur, Wajid, Balad. Before the end of October, troops will have been withdrawn from several other locations. On account of the withdrawal of forces from the above areas, gaps will be created in the deployment of the Force, which could be exploited by hostile forces, thereby increasing the security task. Therefore, the Force, while continuing to protect major seaports and airports and escorting humanitarian convoys, will no longer be in a position to provide permanent protection to United Nations agencies and NGOs at the locations that have been vacated. UNOSOM will however have the capability to react promptly to any anticipated emergency and to carry out humanitarian projects within a radius of 150 kms. By the end of October 1994, UNOSOM II will be concentrated mainly in three locations: Mogadishu area, Baidoa and Kismayo.

23. UNOSOM II continues to support the re-establishment of a Somali police force by providing instruction in basic training to Somali police instructors. However, the Force has been directed to discontinue further issue of police equipment provided by the United States of America and move such equipment to safer locations. Relocation has been completed. The withdrawal of civilian police personnel, already decided by some troop-contributing States, is another factor that increasingly slows down the police programme.

24. In spite of the agreements among Somali factions mentioned above regarding the removal of "technicals" and of checkpoints or roadblocks, such "technicals" are being observed in Mogadishu on a daily basis, particularly around the seaport and the airport. The "technicals" are mounted with machine-guns and recoilless weapons and manned by armed militia. Sporadic small-arms fire can be heard on a continuous basis in Mogadishu.

25. Outside Mogadishu, the threat posed by "technicals" and armed militia is permanent. A total of 17 "technicals" carrying machine-guns and manned by armed militia have been observed recently near Afgooye. Inter-clan fighting has erupted in the vicinity of Baledogle, between Mogadishu and Baidoa. On 7 September a UNOSOM logistics convoy of 18 trucks was ambushed near Wanlaweyn. Only one vehicle reached Baledogle.

26. The most serious of the recent incidents happened in Belet Weyne and in the Indian area of responsibility. On 29 July, in Belet Weyne, troops of the Zimbabwean contingent were completely overrun by a strong militia force. One UNOSOM soldier was killed and the UNOSOM troops had to abandon all their equipment to the militia. The Indian contingent had to face two serious incidents during the same week. On 22 August, an Indian unit escorting a supply convoy was ambushed by armed militia near Burlego, on the Baledogle-Baidoa road. Seven Indian soldiers were killed during this incident. On 31 August, three Indian doctors were killed in Baidoa when a rifle grenade exploded as they were leaving the officers' mess.

27. The most recent significant incident happened in Balad on 9 September. During a ceremony to hand over some United Nations equipment to the local authorities, the latter demanded that all United Nations equipment be handed over to them. In the afternoon of the same day, approximately 100 militia, supported by "technicals", attacked a UNOSOM position protected by troops of the Zimbabwean contingent, with a view to seizing all the equipment before the troops withdrew. UNOSOM troops reacted immediately in self-defence. Four militia members were killed and 39 captured during this incident. No casualties were incurred by the UNOSOM troops. The Zimbabwean contingent finally left Balad with all equipment and stores intact. Immediately upon their departure, some 300 men, women and children rushed into the camp to pick up leftovers. These serious incidents again illustrate the very volatile and virtually uncontrollable situation in Somalia. Similar incidents can happen anywhere, at any time.

IV. THE HUMANITARIAN MISSION

28. United Nations agencies and NGOs have continued to provide humanitarian relief to the most vulnerable segments of the population and rehabilitation assistance wherever conditions of access and security allowed these interventions.

29. The humanitarian situation in Somalia over the past few months has been characterized by relative stability of the major indicators of the health and nutritional status of the majority of the population. Despite sporadic problems, particularly in the Middle Shabelle, Lower Juba and Bay regions, the country as a whole is expecting a good harvest during this rainy season. Under normal conditions of internal stability, security and governance, international assistance should now be shifted to a post-emergency recovery and development phase. Unfortunately, this is not possible in most regions owing to continued banditry, fighting and unrealistic demands for the provision of security or the settlement of petty disputes.

30. In this context, several organizations have either withdrawn their international staff from certain locations or have simply ceased operation. In parallel, the services of coordination, information, logistic support and security that could be provided by UNOSOM have been reduced considerably through a combination of troop reductions, Somali political or military actions and budgetary restrictions. Indeed, following the departure or suspension of activities of UNOSOM in Bossasso, Belet Weyne, Hargeisa, Hoddur, Balad, Wajid

and Bardera in recent weeks and the planned closure of Merka by the end of October, the geographical area where UNOSOM can effectively support humanitarian operations is now reduced to some 50 per cent of what it was in mid-1994.

31. Operations of the United Nations organizations have also decreased, but mainly in the southern part of the country where prevailing security conditions or the impending troop withdrawals have resulted in a temporary suspension of activities in certain locations.

32. The World Food Programme (WFP) is currently active in six regions: Baidoa, Wajid, Hoddur, Galkayo, Bossasso and Hargeisa. Luug was closed because of insecurity. Baidoa remains the logistical hub of the south and requires a strong UNOSOM military presence. Recent problems encountered by WFP in the delivery of commodities through Mogadishu seaport eased during the month of August. WFP, however, estimates that its humanitarian operations in south-central Somalia would be at greater risk without the UNOSOM military presence. However, in northern Somalia, operations continue without the presence of UNOSOM troops.

33. Rain-fed and irrigated areas were surveyed and examined by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in Gedo, Lower Shabelle, Hiran, Juba Valley, Middle Shabelle, Bay and Bakool to determine crop performance. A plant protection campaign and crop demonstration programmes are being implemented. Somalia is one of the nations identified for inclusion in a land-cover mapping project that covers the East African nations and will address development planning, sustainable management, food security, early warning systems and environmental monitoring.

34. The World Health Organization (WHO) continues its operations in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Kismayo, Hargeisa and Bossasso. In its communicable diseases control programme, WHO continues to provide technical support and supplies to local authorities and NGOs involved in the control of endemic diseases. Its basic minimum needs and primary health-care programme and training and manpower development programme continue operations and will remain to do so, security conditions permitting.

35. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was planning to support a number of small-scale activities in the Lower and Middle Shabelle regions and Baidoa, but the absence of UNOSOM's security support in these areas could affect considerations to do so.

36. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) programmes in Somalia have continued to provide vital assistance to children, women and other vulnerable groups, particularly in the areas of health, nutrition, water and sanitation and basic education, in all major areas of the country. UNICEF has received important support from UNOSOM, particularly logistics and security. UNOSOM's provision of security at airports and seaports, and protection of convoys in central and southern Somalia, were and remain essential to UNICEF's programme.

37. UNESCO conducted several workshops and refresher courses for headmasters and teachers during the annual closure of schools in August in Somalia. A mine-awareness campaign in Somali refugee camps in Kenya will be completed in

the coming weeks, covering 30,000 refugees. The production of textbooks and teacher guides in Somali progressed according to predetermined schedules. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)-Somalia now comes under the UNESCO programme of emergency education and rehabilitation (PEER) and, as such, contributes to activities outside Somalia.

38. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), under an agreement with the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, has now assigned a team to reinforce the efforts of UNOSOM's Division for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in assisting internally displaced persons in their return home. Despite numerous difficulties and lack of resources, return convoys continue to be organized regularly with essential support from UNOSOM troops.

39. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has resettlement operations in Kismayo, Bardera, Middle Juba and Hargeisa. Thirty thousand displaced people from Kenya are currently awaiting resettlement to Kismayo as soon as the security situation allows.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

40. Subject to the cooperation of all concerned, the present efforts of the Somali parties, with the assistance of UNOSOM II, could lead to the convening of a Hawiye peace conference and the preparatory meeting for the National Reconciliation Conference by the end of September 1994. My Special Representative will continue his efforts towards that end. However, we should not overlook the daunting difficulties that have, time and again, delayed and frustrated past efforts to implement the Addis Ababa and Nairobi agreements.

41. In my report of 17 August (S/1994/977), I indicated that the end of September would be a crucial period for both the national reconciliation process and the continued involvement of the United Nations in Somalia. In view of the current developments, as well as the assessment of the situation on the ground that is being undertaken by the Secretariat, I expect to be in a position by mid-October to submit to the Security Council, in the second part of my report, my assessment of the prospects of national reconciliation and recommendations for the future of the United Nations operation in Somalia. The Council may therefore wish to consider extending the mandate of UNOSOM II for a period of one month.

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM II)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 932 (1994) of 30 June 1994, in which the Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) until 30 September 1994. It is being submitted prior to the expiry of the Mission's mandate to update the Council on progress in the Lusaka talks and on recent developments in the military and humanitarian situation in Angola. It covers major events up to 15 September 1994. It has perforce been drafted before receipt of the report of the Special Envoy whom I sent to the field in late August (see para. 8 below).

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

2. In the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 12 August 1994 (S/PRST/1994/45), Council members expressed their impatience over the protracted nature of the negotiations and warned that the peace process could not be delayed indefinitely. The Council believed that a just and comprehensive peace agreement was within reach, and strongly urged the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to demonstrate its commitment to peace and accept the complete set of proposals put forward by my Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, and the representatives of the three observer States (United States, Portugal and Russian Federation). The Council also reaffirmed its intention to review the future role of the United Nations in Angola if a peace agreement had not been concluded by 30 September 1994. Council members stated moreover that further procrastination in the peace process would not be tolerated.

3. Since my last report to the Council of 22 July 1994 (S/1994/865) and the above-mentioned statement by the President of the Security Council, discussions on the modalities of national reconciliation have continued in Lusaka and significant progress has been achieved. Following the adoption of the last agenda item relating to national reconciliation, there remained two documents to be considered and approved, one concerning security arrangements for UNITA

leaders and the other regarding UNITA participation in the management of the affairs of State. After intensive consultations, the document concerning security arrangements for UNITA leaders was approved in August.

4. Discussion of the last item on the agenda of the Lusaka peace talks, namely, the United Nations mandate and the role of the observers, including the new mechanism for implementing the Bicesse and Lusaka agreements, began on 15 August 1994. My Special Representative and the representatives of the observer States drafted a compromise document based on contributions from the delegations, which is currently under discussion between the two delegations. So far, 58 of the 70 articles contained in the document have been agreed, including the entire section on the United Nations mandate in Angola relating to military issues, the police, national reconciliation and the electoral process. Had the talks not been interrupted at the request of UNITA following the aerial bombardment of Huambo on 31 August 1994, consideration of this final agenda item might have achieved greater progress. The meetings in Lusaka resumed on 5 September 1994, and the final chapters of the agenda dealing with the role of the observers and the new mechanism for implementing the Bicesse and Lusaka agreements are now being considered.

5. During the reporting period, my Special Representative, with the support of the observer States and other Governments in the region, continued his attempts to convince UNITA to accept the proposals concerning its participation in the State administration. On 20 August 1994, a message from the leader of UNITA, Mr. Jonas Savimbi, was conveyed to President Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, renouncing UNITA's claim to the post of Governor of Huambo. This message was later confirmed by a letter to my Special Representative dated 30 August from Mr. Eugénio Manuvakola, the General Secretary of UNITA and head of its delegation to the peace talks. The same day, my Special Representative and the representatives of the three observer States met with the UNITA delegation, which formally expressed UNITA's acceptance of the plan. Later that day, my Special Representative addressed a letter to UNITA regarding the outcome of his meeting with the UNITA representatives and indicated that it was his perception that UNITA had formally accepted his plan. A copy of the letter was sent to the Government of Angola, which stated that it did not consider that exchange to be formal acceptance by UNITA of the plan.

6. Following renewed contacts, on 5 September 1994, my Special Representative obtained a letter from the UNITA delegation that confirmed formal acceptance of the plan by UNITA. The Government subsequently stated, by a letter dated 9 September 1994, that it considered UNITA's letter of 5 September to be formal and unequivocal acceptance. Accordingly, the plan has now been accepted by both the Government and UNITA, and my Special Representative is of the view that the latter is thus in compliance with the conditions set forth in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Security Council resolution 932 (1994). In view of these developments, members of the Council decided, in a presidential statement made on 9 September 1994 (S/PRST/1994/52), to postpone consideration of the imposition of additional measures against UNITA as set forth in paragraph 26 of Security Council resolution 864 (1993).

7. There are still several issues to be resolved. They include the localities that will be administered by UNITA appointees (30 municipal administrator posts,

35 deputy municipal administrator posts and 75 commune administrators), as well as 6 diplomatic missions.

8. During the reporting period, I decided to dispatch a high-level mission to Angola to prepare an assessment of the current state of United Nations efforts in the areas of peacemaking, peace-keeping and humanitarian activities. The mission was headed by former United Nations Under-Secretary-General James O. C. Jonah, and was composed of staff members from the Departments of Political Affairs, Humanitarian Affairs and Peace-keeping Operations. I will provide the Council with a report on the mission's findings in due course.

III. MILITARY SITUATION AND STATUS OF UNAVEM II

9. In the statement made by its President on 12 August 1994, the Security Council reminded the Government and UNITA that offensive military actions threatened the progress that had been achieved in Lusaka, and that no tactical battlefield advantage was worth the tremendous cost in human suffering that is being paid by the Angolan people. This position was strongly reiterated in the further statement by the President of the Council of 9 September.

10. Since my last report to the Council, the military situation in Angola has nevertheless been marked by an increase in hostilities, although they subsided somewhat in the first part of September. Government troops made significant gains in the northern provinces and were able to consolidate their positions in the areas that the Forças Armadas Angolanas (FAA) had recently recovered. UNITA continued small-scale attacks, guerrilla activities and other military pressure throughout the country. Except for limited tactical success, it has so far been unable to launch large-scale coordinated attacks against FAA. Heavy fighting continued, however, in Cabinda, Lunda Norte and Kwanza Sul provinces and, by the end of August 1994, the military situation in the provinces of Huambo, Bié, Kwando Kubango and Bengo had also deteriorated. In other parts of the country, the situation remained tense. Use of long-range artillery and air assets intensified.

11. In the northern provinces, the situation in Cabinda remained very tense, with fighting continuing throughout July and August. After taking control of the town of Belize on 10 July 1994, the joint forces of UNITA, the Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC) and the Forças Armadas de Cabinda (FAC) made further advances. By the end of August, however, FAA had recaptured the town and surrounding areas. In Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul provinces, the Government maintained firm control over the diamond-producing areas of Cafunfo and Cuango and several other strategically important towns. In the second half of August, UNITA attempted to take over these areas and fierce combat was reported north-east of Cafunfo, but according to FAA, these attacks, which persisted through the beginning of September, were repelled. On 14 August 1994, UNITA reportedly occupied the commune of Quicabo in Bengo Province.

12. In the central provinces, FAA launched a number of attacks on the towns of Quibal and Amboiva (Kwanza Sul Province) and surrounding areas. On the other hand, UNITA intensified its guerrilla activities along the coastline in the last week of August 1994. There were reports that a UNITA battalion had infiltrated

the area of Porto Amboim and had laid ambushes along the road connecting that city with Luanda. During these incidents, seven persons, including an employee of the non-governmental organization Africare, as well as a priest and several nuns, were reportedly kidnapped. Despite intensive efforts to locate them, the fate of these individuals is still unknown. In Benguela Province, UNITA carried out a number of guerrilla attacks and ambushes along the Benguela-Caimbambo-Cubal road. It also kept up pressure on Ebo. The situation around the besieged city of Kuito remained relatively calm; but the Government, which continues to reinforce the city, claimed that it had fought back UNITA attacks there in mid-August. FAA reportedly further expanded its control around Kuito in the last week of August. In the meantime, the air force bombed Huambo on 31 August 1994, resulting in civilian casualties and property damage.

13. The situation in the southern provinces, in particular around Menongue, deteriorated during the last week of August 1994. UNITA reportedly shelled the city with long-range artillery, killing several civilians and causing substantial property damage, but the city remained under government control.

14. Despite the decrease in military action in recent weeks, there are widespread reports of concentrations of FAA and UNITA troops in several parts of the country and of preparations for further attacks and offensives, including against major population centres.

15. There has been no change in the status and mandate of UNAVEM II as set forth in paragraph 14 of my report to the Council dated 11 May 1994 (S/1994/611). The Mission continued to operate at its reduced strength of 50 military, 18 police and 11 military medical staff, complemented by a small number of political, humanitarian and logistical personnel. Teams of military and police observers were deployed at the headquarters in Luanda, as well as at four other locations. In addition to routine activities, the Mission has been involved in comprehensive planning for an expanded UNAVEM. Its presence in Angola remains an essential factor in ongoing efforts to reach a political settlement. Since the Lusaka peace process is at an advanced stage, it is my intention to provide UNAVEM with two additional staff members, one Professional and one General Service, primarily to assist the Mission in translating the rapidly expanding volume of documentation.

IV. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

16. The Council, in the statements made by its President on 12 August and 9 September 1994, expressed its dismay at the actions of both parties, particularly UNITA, that have led to the further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Angola, and again reminded the parties of their responsibility to facilitate the delivery of relief supplies. Nevertheless, since my last report to the Council, the humanitarian situation in Angola continued to be a source of major concern. Ongoing military activities severely limit the ability of humanitarian agencies to carry out their relief operations effectively. A recent review conducted by the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit revealed that, since February 1994, there has been a further 10 per cent increase in the number of people severely affected by the war. Nearly 3.7 million Angolans, mostly displaced and conflict-affected, are now in

need of emergency supplies, which include essential medicines and vaccines, blankets and food aid.

17. Several security incidents that occurred in the second half of August 1994 reflect the unstable and dangerous conditions in which relief agencies are working: aerial bombardment of Huambo on 31 August, artillery shelling targeted at Menongue airport, which caused the temporary suspension of United Nations cargo flights to that destination; the temporary closure of the Porto Amboim-Luanda road because of ambushes and kidnapping of civilians, including staff of international non-governmental organizations and members of their families.

18. On the other hand, there have been some encouraging developments in response to the statement by the President of the Security Council on 12 August 1994, which expressly called for the resumption of relief flights to Malange and Kuito, and the appeal I addressed to President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi. On 23 August 1994, UNITA confirmed that World Food Programme (WFP) cargo and passenger flights to Malange could resume. WFP started deliveries immediately, and United Nations agencies and NGOs re-established their presence in the city. On 29 August 1994, general food distribution began in Malange for the first time in over three months, and feeding centres are now redoubling their efforts to reach all malnourished children and adults in the area. As of 4 September, WFP had delivered over 1,800 tons of food and other relief items to this location.

19. The city of Kuito, which had not been reached by United Nations relief flights since mid-May for lack of security clearance from UNITA, finally became accessible when UNITA granted authorization for such flights on 9 September. However, following several flights carried out by the United Nations between 12 and 14 September 1994, UNITA advised that its authorization had been misunderstood and the United Nations could no longer fly to Kuito. Deaths from starvation and related diseases are reportedly increasing by the day in Kuito, a situation that is sure to be aggravated by the refusal to authorize relief flights.

20. Despite the presence of 12 relief agencies in the city of Huambo, the humanitarian situation there continued to degenerate for lack of adequate relief supplies. Since May 1994, less than 10 per cent of the cargo flights designated by WFP to reach the city have been authorized by the Government, despite public declaration of unimpeded access. Food distribution in Huambo is still subject to disruption, and a large number of nutritional centres have been closed for lack of supplies. The United Nations and NGOs are particularly concerned about the delivery before 15 September of seeds and tools needed for the current planting season.

21. Elsewhere in the country, relief agencies are already distributing seeds and tools in tandem with food aid. In the southern parts of the country, efforts are being made through extensive immunization campaigns to combat an outbreak of meningitis that has already claimed many lives. A campaign has also been launched to stop the spread of a cattle disease that is affecting vital cattle resources. Additional donor funding is needed urgently to maintain the level of vaccinations and to support the non-food sector.

22. United Nations agencies and NGOs, in close collaboration with the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit, have been consolidating plans to implement a nationwide mine-awareness campaign and develop an overall mine-action strategy. Preparatory work on demobilization and reintegration programmes is also continuing.

V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

23. The General Assembly, by its resolution 48/241 of 5 April 1994, provided financial resources for the maintenance of UNAVEM II through the period ending 30 September 1994 at the monthly rate of US$ 2,098,700 gross (US$ 1,997,000 net). Therefore, should the Security Council decide to extend the current mandate of the Mission or entrust a new mandate to the Mission along the lines recommended in paragraphs 15 and 31 of the present report, I shall request the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session to make adequate financial provision for the extension and/or expansion of the Mission.

24. It should be noted, however, that the cash-flow situation of the special account of UNAVEM II continues to be precarious. As of 13 September 1994, outstanding assessed contributions to the account amounted to $23.7 million. Consequently, in order to provide UNAVEM II with the necessary cash flow, a total of $21 million has been borrowed from other peace-keeping accounts for a period exceeding 10 months. These loans remain unpaid.

25. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peace-keeping operations on 13 September 1994 was $1,964 million.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

26. The recent developments in Lusaka have been encouraging, and have given rise to some optimism that a comprehensive settlement to the tragic situation in Angola could be in sight. It is satisfactory that, by formally accepting the complete set of proposals on national reconciliation, UNITA has met the requirements of resolution 932 (1994) and that in consequence the Council decided to postpone consideration of the imposition of additional measures called for in that resolution.

27. Notwithstanding the importance of these developments, additional efforts are needed to bring the Lusaka talks to a successful and rapid conclusion. By all assessments, if both parties display the necessary political will, the remaining issues on the agenda could be resolved without protracted discussion. Further delays would result in the continuation of an armed conflict that has already brought untold suffering to the people of Angola.

28. Having said this, additional efforts and true statesmanship will be required to solve several crucial and very sensitive issues. I shall maintain the United Nations efforts to assist the two parties to reach a successful conclusion by 30 September 1994, as stipulated in the Council's statement of 9 September. But it must be emphasized that it is the leaders of the Government and UNITA who have the duty to capitalize on the recent breakthrough in the

talks. If either of them fails to demonstrate the necessary political will to do this, I will not hesitate to suggest to the Council that it consider implementing paragraph 7 of its resolution 932 (1994) of 30 June, as reaffirmed in subsequent statements by its President.

29. Despite numerous appeals from the Security Council, hostilities have persisted throughout the country. These military actions pose a constant threat to the progress achieved so far in Lusaka. They also exact a tremendous toll in terms of loss of human life and material destruction of the nation's infrastructure. Yet there are again reports of preparations for further major offensives and counter-offensives.

30. I am also deeply disturbed by the renewed attacks against international relief personnel in Angola; their safety and security should be unequivocally guaranteed. It is also essential to ensure unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies throughout the country. I urge both parties, and in particular UNITA, to cooperate fully with the United Nations in this regard.

31. In the hope that the two parties will complete the negotiating process by 30 September, the date on which UNAVEM II's current mandate will expire, I recommend that the mandate be extended for a further short period, until 30 November 1994, to allow time for the talks to conclude, for follow-up meetings to be convened between the military representatives of the Government and UNITA, for the signing of the Lusaka protocols and for preparations for the expansion of UNAVEM. At any time during this period, the Council could decide to adjust the mandate if circumstances so indicated. I trust that the Security Council will remain ready, as it has indicated on several previous occasions, to authorize promptly the increase of the Mission's strength to its previous levels of 350 military observers and 126 police observers, with an appropriate number of international and local staff, if the negotiations can indeed be brought to a successful conclusion.

32. I wish to express my gratitude to President Chiluba of Zambia and to the other heads of State of the subregion for their significant contribution to the search for peace in Angola. I also wish to express once again my appreciation to the representatives of the three observer States for their cooperation and invaluable support, which have contributed so much to the advancement of the peace process.

33. Finally, I would like to pay tribute to my Special Representative, the Chief Military Observer, and the staff of UNAVEM II for the dedication with which they continue to discharge their duties, as well as to the personnel of United Nations agencies and NGOs, who continue to persevere in their efforts to deliver humanitarian aid to those in need under difficult, and often dangerous, circumstances.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1070
19 September 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 SEPTEMBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the answer of the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 16 September 1994 to a question put by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) PAK Gil Yon
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Statement made on 16 September 1994 by the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in response to the Korean Central News Agency

The spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) answered a question put by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on 16 September concerning the discussion of the "nuclear issue" of the DPRK at the September meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In response he made the following statement:

"It is reported that our 'nuclear issue' was discussed along with other matters at the September meeting of the Board of Governors of IAEA held recently at Vienna.

"The mass media assess the meeting as a 'stale meeting', which failed to adopt any 'resolution' in the face of the opposition of many countries to the discussion of the DPRK's 'nuclear issue'.

"However, the Director General of IAEA in his 'report' to the meeting again called for a 'special inspection', urging the DPRK to allow access to additional sites and information. And the president of the meeting in his 'concluding speech' 'appealed' to the DPRK to implement fully the safeguards agreement.

"As for the 'special inspection', we can never allow it because it is a wanton infringement of our sovereignty and part of the policy of stifling the DPRK.

"By bring up the 'special inspection' problem, the IAEA secretariat seeks to justify the partiality of IAEA, infringe continuously on the sovereignty and security of the DPRK and bring the nuclear issue back to the original point of confrontation.

"The nuclear issue has become so complicated today entirely because the IAEA secretariat unreasonably took issue with the DPRK at every meeting of the Board of Governors, politicizing its 'nuclear issue' to an extreme.

"At the June meeting of the Board of Governors, the IAEA secretariat adopted an unreasonable resolution on 'sanctions' against the DPRK over the nuclear issue. Is it entitled now to 'blame' the DPRK over the 'special inspection' and 'implementation of the safeguards agreement'?

"We withdrew from IAEA because we regard independence as our life and soul and did not want to allow the 'special inspection'.

"Facts show that our 'nuclear issue' can never be resolved by infringing on the sovereignty of the DPRK and stifling it, but only through the DPRK-United States talks.

"The IAEA secretariat must stop putting a spoke in the wheel of the DPRK-US talks at a time when the DPRK and the United States have adopted an agreed statement and held expert-level discussions for its implementation.

"If some quarters of the IAEA secretariat, obsessed by the old mode of thinking, continue to resort to pressure with the international meeting and organization as an expedient, the situation will be complicated further.

"The dishonest forces must no longer place obstacles in the way of a solution to the 'nuclear issue' of the DPRK."

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1994/1071
19 September 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 19 SEPTEMBER 1994 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to enclose resolution 5431, adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States on 15 September 1994 and entitled "Coercive measures and threats by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France against the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya".

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ali Sunni MUNTASSER
Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

Resolution

Coercive measures and threats by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France against the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

The Council of the League,

Referring to its previous resolutions, in particular resolution 5373 concerning coercive measures and threats against the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France, which was endorsed by the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement,

Recalling the provisions of Article 33 and Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the pacific settlement of disputes by mediation and judicial settlement without endangering international peace and security,

Expressing deep concern at the human and material damage inflicted on the Libyan people and neighbouring peoples as a result of the implementation of Security Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1992),

Regretting the persistence of the three Western States in their posture of continuing to impose sanctions despite the practical initiative taken by the Council of the League of Arab States, the positive response of the Jamahiriya thereto and its full compliance with the demands of Security Council resolution 731 (1992),

Expressing its appreciation of the efforts of the Committee of Seven and the Secretary-General to bring about a peaceful settlement of the crisis,

Decides

1. To reaffirm its previous resolutions concerning solidarity with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and to commend its cooperation with a view to achieving a peaceful settlement of the crisis in the context of Libyan national sovereignty and international law;

2. To call on the three Western States to respond to the practical proposal contained in League Council resolution 5373 and aimed at achieving a peaceful settlement of the crisis and avoiding any escalation of the situation that might exacerbate tension in the region;

3. To invite the Arab Committee of Seven concerned with monitoring the crisis to intensify its efforts and to contact the parties concerned with a view to urging the Security Council to reconsider the new proposals contained in the League Council resolution and to accept them as a basis for settlement of the crisis;

4. To invite the Secretary-General to follow up the implementation of this resolution and to report thereon to the Council at its next session.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1072
19 September 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 SEPTEMBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In accordance with instructions from my Government, I must express serious concerns as regards the information contained in the note verbale dated 13 September 1994 from the Secretary-General addressed to you (S/1994/5/Add.65).

In the annex to the note verbale, the Secretary-General provides information on flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina not authorized by the United Nations Protection Force, for the period from 9 to 11 September 1994. On 10 September in the late afternoon and evening, mostly from 1830 to 2130 hours, according to the Secretary-General's report, there were 236 unauthorized flights of Serbian rotary-wing aircraft. All were in the area controlled by Bosnian Serbs, in the vicinity of the international border between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)".

My Government is seriously concerned that, in view of the deployment of ground-based international monitors on the border between Serbia/Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure the blockade of military equipment and strategic materials to the Bosnian Serb authorities, the Belgrade Government may be resorting to supplying its Bosnian proxies by air. According to the information available to my Government, the Bosnian Serb authorities should not have a sufficient number of rotary-wing aircraft at their disposal to allow for more than 230 flights in only a three-hour time-span.

In view of the draft resolutions presently before the Council, my Government calls on the members of the Council not to condone these developments, but to look into the particularities of the flights in question, and especially information on where the flights originated and where they terminated.

May I request your kind assistance in distributing the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1073
19 September 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

THIRD PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION UGANDA-RWANDA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Security Council resolution 928 (1994) of 20 June 1994, in which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) for a final period of three months until 21 September 1994 and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the termination of the operation before the completion of its mandate. The present report covers the period since my last report to the Security Council on UNOMUR, dated 16 June 1994 (S/1994/715).

2. It will be recalled that UNOMUR was established by the Security Council in its resolution 846 (1993) of 22 June 1993, with the mandate to deploy on the Ugandan side of the border with Rwanda and to verify that no military assistance reached Rwanda. The Council decided that the monitoring activities of UNOMUR would focus primarily on transit or transport, by roads or tracks that could accommodate vehicles, of lethal weapons and ammunition across the border, as well as any other material that could be of military use.

II. DEPLOYMENT AND ACTIVITIES

3. As indicated in my previous report (S/1994/715), the breakdown of the cease-fire and the resumption of the civil war in Rwanda after 6 April 1994 compelled UNOMUR to expand its monitoring activities in Uganda from the areas controlled by the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) to the entire border area between the two countries. Despite the Mission's phased reduction plan, set out in paragraph 9 of the present report, the expanded monitoring of the 170-kilometre border area continued during the period under review.

4. UNOMUR has implemented its tasks essentially through patrolling, monitoring and surveillance of the whole stretch of the operational area, involving both mobile and fixed observations, as well as on-site investigation of suspected cross-border traffic. Those tasks also included random aerial surveillance and patrols by helicopters, as well as the airlifting of military observers into areas of high elevation for observation of routes leading to the border.

5. Since my last report, the situation of cross-border traffic from Uganda into Rwanda has remained unchanged and no significant movements of armaments or armed personnel have been detected by UNOMUR.

6. In addition to its border-monitoring activities, UNOMUR has more recently played an important role in supporting the build-up of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and coordinating humanitarian activities in support of the displaced persons and other civilians affected by the hostilities in Rwanda. That role was performed at a critical time when the resumed fighting in Rwanda made the use of Kigali airport difficult and, at a later stage, impossible. UNOMUR activities in that respect have continued even after the unilateral declaration of a cease-fire by RPF on 18 July in order to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population in Rwanda.

7. Following the adoption on 17 May by the Security Council of its resolution 918 (1994), in which it authorized the expansion of the UNAMIR force level to 5,500 all ranks, the Mission became a forward base to back up the movement of personnel, equipment and supplies into Rwanda. During the closure of Kigali airport, Entebbe airport in Uganda functioned as the only air base from which those personnel and supplies were routed by land to Rwanda. A team of UNOMUR military observers was stationed at Entebbe to coordinate logistic activities. UNOMUR escorted 60 armoured personnel carriers as well as convoys with logistic material and foodstuffs from Entebbe to the Uganda-Rwanda border for use by UNAMIR. A temporary transit camp with the capacity of accommodating at least 100 troops was established at the Mirama Hills checkpoint to ensure smooth entry of newly arriving UNAMIR troops into Rwanda.

8. The evacuation of UNAMIR casualties was carried out with UNOMUR assistance. UNOMUR also made a total of 117 helicopter sorties between Kabale and Entebbe during the period under review, as well as between Kabale and the Zairian towns of Goma and Bukavu, in order to transport UNAMIR and other United Nations personnel.

9. In accordance with paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 928 (1994), I have started implementing the following plan to reduce the size of UNOMUR in four phases, with its monitoring activities being scaled down gradually. The first three of the four phases have already been carried out.

10. Phase I of the reduction took effect on 15 August and the Mission's total strength of 80 military observers was reduced by 25. Accordingly, the Sector West headquarters and the observation posts at Lubirizi and Kafunzo were closed down. In Phase II, effective from 30 August, the Mission was further reduced by nine military observers.

11. In Phase III, effective from 6 September, an additional 12 military observers left the Mission, leaving a total strength of 34 military observers. The Sector East headquarters was closed during that period and the UNOMUR team stationed at Entebbe was withdrawn. As at 12 September 1994, in addition to the remaining military observers, the Mission also included 11 international civilian and 7 locally recruited staff, who are being phased out. In the final phase of reduction, which is to be completed at the end of the Mission's mandate on 21 September, all the remaining military observers will leave the area of

operation. UNOMUR will be officially closed down on that date in a small ceremony to be presided over by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, Mr. Kofi Annan, who will be in the region at that time.

III. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

12. As indicated in my report on the financing of UNAMIR (A/48/837 and Corr.1), the administrative costs related to the military observers and civilian personnel of UNOMUR, with effect from 22 December 1993, are included in the cost estimates for the maintenance of UNAMIR. The General Assembly, in its resolution 48/248 of 5 April 1994, authorized me to enter into commitments at a monthly rate not to exceed $9,082,600 gross per month for the period from 5 April to 31 October 1994, for the maintenance of both operations.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

13. UNOMUR was established in June 1993 to help create an atmosphere conducive to a negotiated settlement of the Rwandese conflict. While the tragic turn of events in Rwanda prevented UNOMUR from contributing to that goal, the Observer Mission did play a useful role as a confidence-building mechanism in the months following the conclusion on 4 August 1993 of the Arusha peace agreement and during UNAMIR's initial efforts to defuse tensions between the Rwandese parties and to facilitate the implementation of that agreement. Following the resumption of the civil war in Rwanda, UNOMUR also played an important role in support of the deployment of the expanded UNAMIR and of the coordination of humanitarian relief activities in that country.

14. In conclusion, I would like to express again my appreciation to the Government of Uganda for the cooperation and assistance it has extended to UNOMUR. I also wish to commend both the military and the civilian personnel of UNOMUR for the dedication and professionalism with which they have carried out their tasks.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
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S/1994/1074
19 September 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 SEPTEMBER 1994 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey to you the attached report addressed to me on 19 September 1994 by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, dealing with the establishment of an International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

I should be grateful if you would bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Annex

Report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on the establishment and commencement of operations of an International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is in its third year. Successive blueprints for peace have been drawn up with the parties and then subsequently repudiated by one side or the other: the Carrington-Cutiliero plan; the Vance-Owen plan; "the invincible package"; the European Union action plan. In January-February 1994, the parties agreed, in talks held under the auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, on a constitutional framework and modalities for the implementation and monitoring of a cessation of hostilities and on the greater part of a map for the allocation of the territory. However, disagreement persisted on, at most, 2 per cent of the territory. Various methods were suggested by the Co-Chairmen, to no avail, to overcome the impasse on this small percentage of the territory. They included arbitration under the auspices of the Security Council.

II. CONTACT GROUP PROPOSAL

2. In the light of this experience with successive peace plans, consultations took place involving the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee and Governments with influence on the parties. This led to the signing of the Washington accords for the establishment of the Bosniac-Croat Federation (see S/1994/255, annex I) and the establishment of a contact group consisting of five countries, namely France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, working with the International Conference. The Contact Group was guided in its work by the resolutions of the Security Council, by declarations adopted by Foreign Ministers of the Contact Group countries meeting in Geneva on 13 May and on 5 and 30 July, by the provisions of the European Union action plan and by the previous efforts of the International Conference.

3. The Contact Group drew up a map for the allocation of territory between the Bosniac-Croat Federation and the Bosnian Serb entity and submitted it to the two sides on 6 July. The map allocated 51 per cent to the Bosniac-Croat Federation and 49 per cent to the Bosnian Serb entity. The Contact Group, reinforced by the support of the Security Council and the Council of Ministers of the European Union, as well as by Governments and organizations world wide, informed the parties that the proposed map would have to be accepted as presented, unless the parties could agree between themselves on changes. At the end of July, the Bosniac-Croat Federation accepted the proposed map. The Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) also accepted the

map. Leaders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) urged the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the Contact Group map. To date the Bosnian Serb leadership has not done so.

4. The Contact Group countries had made it quite clear from the outset that there would be incentives for acceptance of its proposal and disincentives for rejection.

III. CLOSURE BY THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO) OF ITS BORDER WITH THE BOSNIAN SERBS

5. On 4 August 1994, the following measures were ordered by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), to come into effect the same day:

(a) "To break off political and economic relations with the Republica Srpska

(b) "To prohibit the stay of the members of the leadership of the Republica Srpska (Parliament, Presidency and Government) in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

(c) "As of today the border of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is closed for all transport towards the Republica Srpska, except food, clothing and medicine."

IV. FOLLOW-UP BY THE CO-CHAIRMEN

6. At the request of the Secretary-General, the United Nations Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee, Mr. Stoltenberg, visited Belgrade and Pale from 12 to 14 August. He discussed with President Milosevic the implementation of the measures announced for the closure of the border and their verification. Lord Owen and Mr. Stoltenberg followed up by visiting Belgrade, Podgorica and Zagreb from 4 to 6 September.

7. The Co-Chairmen discussed the border closure at length with President Milosevic and Foreign Minister Jovanovic in Belgrade on 4 September, and with President Bulatovic in Podgorica on 5 September. On 5 September, the day after the Co-Chairmen's conversation in Belgrade, Mr. Jovanovic sent the Co-Chairmen a letter recalling a proposal that had been made by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the effect that representatives of international humanitarian organizations, in conjunction with representatives of the local Red Cross, could "establish joint controls" at places where humanitarian assistance "is organized and dispatched from". The Foreign Minister requested the Co-Chairmen to propose "relevant humanitarian organizations", to work in conjunction with the local Red Cross, to establish joint controls of the type mentioned.

8. At the Co-Chairmen's request, a member of their staff, Mr. Pellnas, had detailed technical discussions in Belgrade on 4 September with Mr. Kertes, the head of Customs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and on 5 September in Podgorica with Mr. Bosko Bojeric, the Deputy Interior Minister of Montenegro. In the light of the report they received, the Co-Chairmen decided to explore the possibility of sending to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) an International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Mission composed of personnel provided through national humanitarian organizations who would control the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance at designated crossing-points and who would have freedom of access elsewhere in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). It would report to the Co-Chairmen and, through them, to the Secretary-General and the Presidency of the European Union, on the implementation of the border closure.

9. From the preparatory work done by Mr. Pellnas, it was concluded that an International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Mission could aim initially for 135 international members. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) offered to provide free of charge 65 drivers and also offered 7 cars to start with. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) also said it would arrange for 65 interpreters to be paid by the Mission. The Mission Coordinator would be Mr. Bo Pellnas (Sweden), acting in a civilian capacity. Its financing would come from voluntary contributions and countries would be expected to pay for the persons they sent.

10. The Co-Chairmen kept the Contact Group, which was then meeting in Berlin, fully briefed on these developments. The Contact Group welcomed and supported their efforts.

11. The Co-Chairmen immediately sounded out the Nordic countries and obtained commitments that they would supply 60 persons to be in Belgrade within one week. They also obtained definite promises of $200,000 start-up money from two of the Nordic countries.

12. In view of these developments, the Co-Chairmen, on 8 September, informed the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) that they were ready to set up an International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Mission along the lines discussed with him and President Milosevic, and President Bulatovic on 4 and 5 September. The Co-Chairmen noted that Mr. Pellnas had worked out a number of details about the proposed Mission in meetings with the head of Customs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and with the Deputy Interior Minister of Montenegro. The Co-Chairmen added that Mr. Pellnas would consult with other relevant humanitarian organizations and other countries. They further informed the Foreign Minister that the Nordic countries were ready to put some people in quickly. The Co-Chairmen said that they hoped to be able to provide more details early in the following week, by which time Mr. Pellnas would hopefully be in a position to go to Belgrade and to discuss the matter in more detail.

13. At the request of the Co-Chairmen, Mr. Pellnas arrived in Belgrade on Wednesday, 14 September accompanied by seven persons from France, Germany, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States. Mr. Pellnas

immediately met with representatives of the Yugoslav authorities. Meetings continued the following day. The Yugoslav authorities agreed that all traffic would be stopped between 1900 hours and 0600 hours on all crossings except the two used for humanitarian traffic. All ferry traffic would also be stopped. Moreover, the number of international staff assigned to the Mission could be raised to 200.

14. Mr. Pellnas was assured by the Yugoslav authorities of full access to all parts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). They gave Mr. Pellnas a formal commitment to provide the Mission with sufficient helicopter resources. They accepted the establishment of a radio communication net as requested by Mr. Pellnas. They also agreed to his request that the drivers provided by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should be police officers.

V. TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE MISSION

15. On Friday, 16 September, Mr. Pellnas saw the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and submitted to him, on behalf of the Co-Chairmen, the following arrangements for the establishment of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Mission:

> "1. The Coordinator of the Mission is to be a member of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia staff, Mr. Bo Pellnas, answerable to us as Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. The Mission will consist of such international civilian staff made available to the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia whom we select after discussion with your Government, and those of Serbia and Montenegro.
>
> "2. The Mission will be organized out of Belgrade, initially from the Norwegian Embassy, and will have three sections in the field: one in Montenegro and two in Serbia. Each section will initially be organized into teams of four persons: two international staff, one local interpreter to be paid by the Mission and one local driver to be supplied and paid by your Government. It may be necessary to move teams quickly from one section to another as the Mission requires and for this purpose the helicopters which your Government has agreed to provide will be helpful.
>
> "3. International staff of the Mission, who will carry International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia certificates, will have the status of members of a diplomatic mission. Property and premises, including temporary ones, established by the Mission for its members shall not be seized or interfered with.
>
> "4. Teams and members of the Mission will be granted full freedom of movement. Their movements and their right to remain in any place shall not be subject to any requirement of prior notice or authorization.
>
> "5. Taking into account that the responsibility of controlling the crossings remains with your Government, members of the Mission will be

enabled to work with representatives of the Yugoslav Red Cross at places from which any humanitarian assistance is organized or dispatched; to work alongside customs officers; to look into any vehicles crossing; and to have examined any item conveyed by individuals or vehicles across the border which they suspect might not be classified as purely humanitarian. For this purpose the members of the Mission are to have the possibility of examining customs, commercial, transport and related documentation, access to facilities where goods are loaded or, if inspection during loading is not feasible, the right to require unloading of vehicles, and the assistance in specific cases of your authorities in carrying out examinations.

"6. The Government is to ensure the security and safety of members of the Mission, without thereby interfering with their movement and work.

"7. The Mission will be authorized to maintain communications between their teams, their sections, their Belgrade offices and Geneva by communication satellites as well as by radio transmitters.

"If the above-mentioned conditions forming the basis for our proposals in this letter no longer exist, we reserve our right as Co-Chairmen to withdraw the Mission at any time we determine."

16. On Saturday, 17 September, Foreign Minister Jovanovic formally transmitted to the Co-Chairmen, through Mr. Pellnas, his Government's "full acceptance" of the above-mentioned arrangements proposed by the Co-Chairmen. The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Mission in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) was thus formally established as of 17 September 1994.

VI. MISSION CONCEPT

17. The Mission is being organized with personnel provided through national humanitarian organizations. It will have three sections working in the field, which will be given resources corresponding to the number of crossings within their area of responsibility, it being understood that it would be possible to carry out a quick change of resources between the sections, in order to achieve a concentrated presence in areas where needed.

18. The sections will be organized into groups of four teams, each team consisting of two international members, an interpreter, a driver and a car. The interpreter and the driver will be provided by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

19. The Mission will exercise its right to go wherever it wishes, without any form of prior notification, to follow the work of customs officers of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and to actually look into vehicles crossing the border.

VII. COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATIONS

20. Following the initial party of 8 that assembled in Belgrade on 14 September, a second contingent of 19 persons arrived in Belgrade on Friday, 16 September, from Norway and the United Kingdom. A third contingent of 10, from France, Denmark, Spain and the United Kingdom, will arrive on Monday, 19 September. A further contingent of 15 persons from Finland will arrive on Tuesday, 20 September. As of Tuesday, 20 September, 52 international members of the Mission will thus have arrived in Belgrade. The Mission has already assembled some local drivers, local interpreters and vehicles provided by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). In addition the Government is making helicopters available for use of the Mission.

21. Mr. Pellnas has had extensive discussions in Belgrade with the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) as well as with Serbian and Montenegrin authorities. A number of meetings have been held with the head of Customs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

22. On 17 September, Mr. Pellnas flew to Podgorica for a meeting with the Montenegrin authorities. As agreed in the talks with Mr. Kertes, a helicopter was provided by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Mr. Pellnas had a meeting in Podgorica with the Deputy Interior Minister. Mr. Pellnas briefed him on what had been agreed during his talks in Belgrade and asked for his support of the Mission in Montenegro. Mr. Bojevic made a very firm commitment to Mr. Pellnas, promising his Government's full cooperation and support. He also promised to take every possible step to ensure the safety and security of the members of the Mission. He informed Mr. Pellnas about actions that had been taken against two private businessmen who had been caught smuggling fuel into Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both had been sent to prison. The seized vehicles and fuel had been sold and the proceeds given to the Montenegrin Red Cross.

23. On 16 September, the Mission sent out its first reconnaissance team of two members, who visited the border crossings between Zvornik and Kotroman and also made a visit to Pripolje, which is to be the base for one of the three field sections within the Mission. The team had complete freedom of movement and thus arrived unannounced at the crossings. It saw very little traffic south of Zvornik and reported that the crossings appeared to be seriously controlled. They saw all crossing cars being checked. They observed no trucks at any of the crossing-points. The team also reported that the border now had all the signs of a national border, with flags, barriers and, at places, even some defensive military positions.

24. On 17 September, the Mission sent out a team to Pripolje to start preparations in an area judged to have the highest priority. On 18 September, the Mission established a presence in Niksic with one team, while another team started working at the packing centre for humanitarian aid in Belgrade. As soon as the necessary logistical arrangements are in place, the remaining teams will be deployed to reinforce the Pripolje and Niksic centres and also to commence operations from Banja Koviljaca, between Loznica and Zvornik.

25. Out of the 10 members arriving on Monday, 19 September, the core of a headquarters will be organized and the commanders of the three field section centres will be chosen and sent out. The 15 Finnish members due to arrive on Tuesday, 20 September will be put at the disposal of the three section commanders.

26. Further meetings between the federal Customs authorities and the experts supporting the Mission will be held on Monday, 19 September, in order to develop working procedures further.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS

27. Mr. Pellnas has reported to the Co-Chairmen that the federal Government and the federal authorities have fully cooperated with the Mission and have sought in every way to facilitate its work. The teams sent out by the Mission have had complete freedom of movement.

28. The Mission's first impressions from the border areas visited coincide with reports it has received from visitors from other international organizations and seem to verify that the federal Government is taking every action to seal off the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Bosnia and Herzegovina effectively.